

Mr. NOLTING. I think it would add to the difficulties without question.

Senator LAUSCHE. I would like to conduct some hearings and find out what the status is of the attitude of Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya, about Souvanna Phouma.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you very much for a very fine presentation. I don't envy you, in your job.

Mr. NOLTING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is very encouraging to me to see the depth and interest that your committee takes in this. It is a hard one, and I think we can do something.

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

BRIEFING ON THE WORLD SITUATION

MONDAY, JANUARY 15, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you this morning. Everyone understands that this is an executive meeting, and I have assured the Secretary that it will be executive in order that he may be as frank and as candid as possible. In all of these cases many things and many names are mentioned, and it would be too bad for it to get into the press, because we are engaged in so many delicate negotiations these days that I think it would be very harmful to the course of these negotiations if we allowed any of these confidential discussions to become public.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed. We are very pleased to have you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen.

It is always a great privilege to meet with this committee, and in the circumstances of an executive session where we can go into many of our problems in great depth and with as much candor as is possible. It makes quite a difference not to have four different audiences listening in to what one says, our own people, the Sino-Soviet bloc, the neutrals, and our allies.

Necessarily, unless my remarks are to be intolerably long, I will have to do certain selection, but that does not mean that I am not at the disposal of the committee on other matters that I do not touch upon in the course of my introductory remarks.

SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

I think the first point that I would like to mention is that we have since the adjournment of the Congress been putting in a great

But Portugal is, of course, deeply disturbed by the Goan affair,⁶ as you can well understand that they are, but they nevertheless are, I think, deeply disturbed by the circumstances of the 20th century as it bears on their overseas holdings. I think, on the one side, their NATO allies cannot give them strong support toward a wholly negative policy overseas and, on the other side, Portugal has not seemed willing to move to improve its own position politically.

GOOD RELATIONSHIPS ARE POSSIBLE

We have in our own system an example of a relationship which, on the one side, is close with us and, on the second, is basically solid against so-called colonial attacks, and that is the relationship with Puerto Rico.

If Portugal were in position to say about Angola that the relations between Portugal and Angola are subject to the consent of the Angolese, it would be reasonable to suppose that for a very considerable period of time to come the responsible Angolese leaders, particularly after they get their electoral system set up, might well want to continue some sort of close relationships with Portugal because of the mutual advantages there.

The relationships of the former French-speaking African states and their metropolitan country is, on the whole, a good relationship. We have had indications from Arab sources that once the Algerian question is settled, this could transform the relations between France and Arab North Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, and right across the littoral there.

But we are deeply concerned about NATO and our own relations with Portugal. The Azores base is important to us. About 85 percent of our military air traffic to Europe and to the Mediterranean area goes through the Azores base.

We cannot, I think, brush it off as being of no importance to us and, of course, it would be, I think, unfortunate if Portugal should withdraw from NATO.

REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN ANGOLA

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Secretary, have you seen the Robert Young NBC white paper on Angola?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I have, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that true?

Secretary RUSK. I would say that it is not the whole truth, by any means. What was shown there was, I think, true, but it is much more complex than that.

Senator HUMPHREY. I sent over to Mr. Dutton⁷ the report that I received on it, and I want to tell you if even 50 percent of it is true, it is subhuman.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator HUMPHREY. And I hate to be associated with such filth and degradation of humanity as has gone on. If that responsible

⁶In December 1961. Indian troops invaded the Portugese colony of Goa, which was incorporated into India.

⁷Fred Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

radio network has any degree of integrity to it at all, it is incredible.

Secretary Rusk. I do not think, Senator, that did justice to a lot of other things that were being done, in education, in health, in changing the status of the local inhabitants nor, of course, could it have taken into account these far-reaching changes in local government which are apparently going into effect in February.

OAS MEETING ON CUBA

On the inter-American system—and I have been running much too long, Mr. Chairman—our principal problem there is, of course, the meeting of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este beginning next Monday.

This was called by the Council of the Organization to consider the Cuban question. We have had most intensive consultation with members in advance of the meeting. The situation is approximately the following as of this morning:

There is no question that the OAS will go much further than it has done yet in declaring the application of the basic principles of the Western Hemisphere system to Cuba, and denouncing Cuba for failure to comply with its own obligations.

There is a group of, perhaps, 12, 13, possibly 14 countries, chiefly in Central America and North and South America, that would be prepared to go forward now at this meeting for a call for a break in diplomatic and commercial relations.

Our problem has been that the countries in the southern part of South America, from Brazil to Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador and, perhaps, Bolivia either do not feel sufficiently concerned about the Cuban question to feel that they want to move, or have serious domestic problems of their own which make it difficult for their governments to take a position.

POSITIONS OF MEXICO AND BRAZIL

Two of the cases of the latter type countries will be Mexico and Brazil. Mexico has what they call a juridical objection to the calling of the meeting under the present circumstances, and with the Rio Treaty in mind. But I think, more important than that, former President Cardenas⁸ is there as the active leader of a group which would give the present government considerable trouble if Mexico would join in sanctions on Cuba at this point.

We believe, we know privately, if the hemispheric system itself moves with respect to sanctions that Mexico, even though abstaining or voting against, would nevertheless follow the hemisphere. They have made that clear to us privately.

In the case of Brazil, a situation which has not settled down since the governmental changes that recently occurred there, I think their government believes that whatever happens, they are in trouble. I think Brazil would prefer that there not be a meeting because if Brazil votes for sanctions against Cuba, their left will

⁸Gen. Lazaro Cardenas, former president of Mexico.

cause them great difficulty. If they do not vote for sanctions, and the rest of us do, then their right will give them very great trouble.

Brazil is a country that represents practically a third of Latin America in the sense of population, position, manpower, and so forth, and this is something that I think is a genuine worry.

IMMEDIATE SANCTIONS V. REFERRAL TO COUNCIL

The issue is likely to boil down to the question of whether the OAS at its meetings at Punta del Este actually attempts to apply sanctions at that meeting or whether they declare the basic situation and refer the question of sanctions to the Council of the OAS for further consideration and possible action.

It was the latter technique, with the exception of the break in diplomatic relations, that was used in the case of the Dominican Republic. The Council did recommend the breaking of additional trade relations with the Dominican Republic, following the meeting of San Jose last year.

Our dilemma is this, quite frankly: although we are not certain of it under present circumstances, we, perhaps, could by maximum pressure obtain 14 votes at Punta del Este for an immediate break of diplomatic relations. Thirteen countries have already done so. But that would run the risk of having Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico outside of that action.

The problem is that means 60 percent, in effect, of the people of the power, if you like, in Latin America, and it would run the risk of giving Castro a sense that he had obtained, in effect, a considerable victory down there, so this is the dilemma we are in now.

AWAIT OUTCOME OF DISCUSSIONS

The Argentine has been firming up its position recently in the course of discussions, and Brazil has been doing a bit of the same, although the Brazilian position is not yet consistent with any immediate application of sanctions.

Mr. Chairman, I would not wish today—I hope we can have a chance to speak to this later in the week after we have heard from some of the other governments about some of the later discussions. I would not wish, myself, to urge a single, final position on this point as to what our choice will be.

I must say I am concerned about an action taken just by a bare majority of 14, leaving many of these principal countries outside of the majority. If we could find a way to proceed that would conclude by getting us 17 or 18 votes rather than 14, I think we would want to give that serious consideration.

BRAZIL'S VOTING RECORD

Senator AIKEN. Is it not a fact, Mr. Secretary, that Brazil is the only country in the Western Hemisphere that has never failed us, unless they have this year? I know last year Brazil was the only country in the Western Hemisphere that invariably stood by the United States.

Senator GORE. I do not think Mexico has voted with us in the United Nations for 3 years.

Senator AIKEN. Maybe half the time. Cuba voted with us some of the time not much, but a little. Brazil never failed us, and I think it was the only country.

Secretary RUSK. At the present time I hesitate to say they are in a special crisis, because so long as I can remember, and that is quite a few years, Brazil is always in a crisis and is about to collapse. Somehow it never quite does, and it continues to grow.

But their leadership at the top is uncertain at the present time. [Joao] Goulart, as President, has constituted a moderate Cabinet, but the Cabinet is uncertain of its position, and it is exposed to considerable pressures both from the left and from the right.

To answer your question, Senator Aiken, I think Brazil would be very deeply chagrined to find itself out away from the rest of us on an issue of this sort.

Senator AIKEN. All 70 million of them?

Secretary RUSK. I am not so sure that all 70 million would be.

Senator AIKEN. But a majority.

Secretary RUSK. A very considerable majority of them, and I think that is one of the things that is in the mind of not just our own Government, but the Argentine, that we have to think about the special problems that the Brazilian Government has in the situation.

LACK OF STABILITY

Senator AIKEN. And Brazil is fighting for its stability at the present time, and is likely to—

Secretary RUSK. The present government is not fighting as hard for its stability as we hoped they would.

The economic situation there has gotten a bit out of hand. They do need to pick themselves up and get on with it.

Senator AIKEN. I did not mean monetary stability, I meant political.

Secretary RUSK. Political, that is quite right.

WHICH COURSE OF ACTION?

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you decided on what course you are going to follow as between these two, if any one?

Secretary RUSK. I think we will have to come to that a little later in the week, Senator, because we need to hear more about—as I say, there have been exchanges with these various governments on almost a daily basis for the last three weeks.

President Lleras Camargo and President Frondizi⁹ are both taking an active initiative here. They are trying to work together on some of these points, and perhaps by the middle of the week we will know a little more clearly exactly what the situation is. But that is the kind of dilemma we may be faced with on this point.

⁹Alberto Lleras Camargo, President of Colombia, and Arturo Frondizi, President of Argentina.

RESOLUTION URGING STRONGER OAS ACTION

Senator HUMPHREY. May I ask, I noticed the Chairman had a House resolution in his hands which was brought to my attention some time ago. Is there any—what is that resolution number?

The CHAIRMAN. It is 226.

I talked to the Secretary about this, and he said he would like to have an opportunity to discuss it with the President before he advises us.

Secretary RUSK. Our general attitude on this resolution earlier in the spring was that we would like to see there—because we would like to have from the meeting at Punta del Este as strong an attitude about the Organization of American States as is possible to obtain without the kind of split in the OAS that would give Castro a victory—

Senator HUMPHREY. This is a resolution putting the House on record as urging stronger action in the OAS vis-a-vis Cuba on the question of sanctions.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is whether it would actually promote our purpose. I think we ought to be given an opportunity to discuss it.

Secretary RUSK. The point in the resolution about the Inter-American Defense Board has been taken care of. Cuba does not sit on it at the present time.

DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, are you going to proceed to Asia?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. I am afraid I have been talking too much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No, go right ahead. It has been very interesting.

Secretary RUSK. Let me make a remark about Southeast Asia and the Congo, and then perhaps we can go to questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

Secretary RUSK. We have been generally encouraged by the development in the situation in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and the Republic of China.

In the case of the Republic of China, they went through a very nervous period in the General Assembly over the Chinese representation issue, but they had a very successful conclusion, and we believe that has helped greatly to settle them down and to stabilize their situation.

NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING LAOS

In Laos, we are still on the track that was initiated in January, when the United States agreed with Great Britain and France and certain others of its SEATO allies to try to find out whether a negotiated solution could be found that would avoid a war in that country.

These discussions have been protracted, they have been difficult, and have been made no less difficult because the Laotian leaders themselves, for perfectly understandable reasons, have great bitterness toward each other. They have memories which go back to pe-

riods when they were fighting each other, and any kind of negotiation for them seems to be extremely difficult.

As far as the Geneva Conference itself is concerned, the international aspects of it have moved toward a reasonably good prospect. The buttoning up of those discussions now depends upon the possibility of a coalition government in Laos itself.

There had been gain in the discussions from the point of view of the West, and one impasse.

I hesitate to use language that sounds perhaps like it is a little esoteric at this point, but these long negotiations tend to create that kind of terminology.

ATTEMPTS TO SET UP NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT

Souvanna Phouma, who was authorized by the King to attempt to find a government, started out with a formula of four members of the present government, based on Vientiane, on one side, four members of the Pathet Lao on the other side, and eight of his own neutralists in the center. We and the Laotian Government people felt this was not a promise of a genuinely neutral government, because among those that he considered in the eight in the center were some who were under very strong Pathet Lao influence and did not seem to us to suggest a possibility of neutralism.

Over a period of some weeks, Souvanna Phouma has changed that formula not to 4-8-4 but to 4-5-5-4 the two 5 being a split-up of the neutralist influence between those who are personal followers of his, on the one side, and five who have had previous experience in government in Vientiane, but who are not now associated with the present government. In other words, we call those fellows Vientiane neutrals. This is the Xiengkhouang neutrals and the Vientiane neutrals.

ALLOCATION OF PORTFOLIOS

Now, the problem is to talk the details over about the actual allocation of portfolios.

Souvanna Phouma has not gotten around to that in detail, so far as the other princes are concerned. He has given us some indication of what he has in mind and, by the large, it is not too bad in terms of getting responsible people to take the key portfolios. But the impasse is on the portfolios of defense and interior, because those are the two who will determine who have the instruments of actual power in the country.

Souvanna Phouma so far has been insisting that he be the Defense Minister, and that the Interior Minister be one of his own Xiengkhouang neutrals. The present government people, Phoumi and Bon Oum,¹⁰ insist that both of these portfolios be given to present governmental people and, particularly, to General Phoumi.

One can understand why General Phoumi does not want to surrender his position with regard to the armed forces and, at the

¹⁰In December 1960, right-wing forces under Gen. Phoumi Nosavan deposed Souvanna Phouma and installed Boun Oum as Laotian premier. In the new coalition government created in June, 1962, Gen. Phoumi took Boun Oum's place, serving as deputy premier and finance minister. Souvanna Phouma served as premier and defense minister.